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Abstract
This thesis aims to investigate the properties of self-enforcing
International Environmental Agreements (IEAs) and the incentives
to invest in R&D to develop a cost-reducing abatement technology.
The analysis is based on a quadratic cost-benet model introduced
by Scott Barrett in 1994. I have extended the model to includ-
ing investments in R&D. The countries in the model presented are
symmetric with regards to costs and benets of pollution abatement,
but asymmetric with regards to the possibilities of investing in R&D.
When assuming that one "enthusiastic" country invests in a tech-
nology that lowers the cost of pollution abatement for all countries,
the result alters the grim picture that is painted in the literature on
self-enforcing IEAs. By including the possibilities for strategic tech-
nology investments, the size of the stable IEA increases. So does the
optimal level of abatement. Furthermore, global welfare increases.
In the model outlined in this thesis, it leads to a Pareto-improvement
in the welfare-level of the respective nations, including the enthusi-
astic country. The thesis thus concludes that future climate negotia-
tions should put a heavier focus on the development and di¤usion of
technologies that lower the costs of reducing emissions, rather than
strict emission reduction targets and binding timeframes.
v
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1 Introduction
The UN initiated the rst discussions on global warming in the 1980s. At the
Rio Earth Summit in 1992, the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) came into place, which laid the foundation for the global climate
negotiations as we know them today. The objective was the stabilization of
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would pre-
vent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system(UNFCCC,
1992, Article 2). The countries involved in the negotiations acknowledged that
developed nations should contribute relatively more than developing nations to
reducing the damages caused by climate change, since the main responsibility
for the high levels of greenhouse gases (GHGs) in the atmosphere was due to
the industrialization and economic growth in the developed part of the world.
The cooperation should therefore be in accordance with the countriescommon
but di¤erentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities(UNFCCC, 1992,
Article 3). It did not, however, specify any quantitative targets on emission
reductions, which can explain why it was signed by so many countries (Barrett,
2003).
In 1997 the Kyoto Protocol was constructed, which introduced quantitative
emissions reduction targets for 37 industrialized nations, referred to as Annex
1 countries. The protocol required the Annex 1 countries to cap their emis-
sions of GHGs "at least 5 per cent below 1990 levels in the commitment period
2008 - 2012" (UNFCCC, 1998, Article 3). It also arranged for exible mech-
anisms, such as quota trading, to enable the countries to reach their emission
targets more cost-e¢ ciently (Victor, 2004). However, the non-Annex 1 coun-
tries, mostly developing countries, were not subject to any emissions ceiling,
and had therefore nothing to loose from signing the agreement (Barrett, 2003).
A further target was agreed upon at the climate negotiations in Copenhagen in
2009. Here, the parties involved agreed to reduce global emissions so as to limit
the increase in the average global temperature to 2 degrees above pre-industrial
levels (UNFCCC, 2009). The target was, on the other hand, not backed by
binding emission reduction plans and timeframes. Reducing emissions to the
point of reaching the 2 degree goal will therefore be hard to fulll under the
current regime of climate negotiations (Victor, 2011).
Despite the fact that there are now 191 countries that have signed the Ky-
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oto Protocol, the international climate negotiations are su¤ering from major
structural challenges. There is still no global agreement on combating climate
change and reduce emissions of GHGs. The United States failed to ratify the
Kyoto Protocol in 2001. This was partly due the climate scepticism and oppo-
sition of the conservative movement in the country, and partly because the US
would not accept mandatory reductions in GHG emissions without also impos-
ing the same standards in developing countries (McCright and Dunlap, 2003).
Canada followed by withdrawing from the agreement in 2011, arguing that "The
Protocol only covers countries responsible for a small, and increasingly smaller,
percentage of global emissions and, as a consequence, is not an e¤ective vehicle
for addressing the global challenge of climate change." 1
An important obstacle to reaching a sustainable solution is thus that de-
veloping countries do not face binding emission targets. Major countries, like
China and India, which are two of the top three GHG emitting countries along
with the US, do not face any legally binding commitments. Emissions stem-
ming from developing countries have been rising rapidly, and without deeper
e¤orts by these countries, the shift towards a low-carbon world will be di¢ -
cult (IEA, 2012). This concern is expressed by developed countries, which are
willing to undergo further emission reductions if major developing economies
increase their e¤orts. This was one of the reasons why the US did not ratify
the Kyoto protocol, and the European Union (EU) is willing to increase their
emission reduction targets towards 2020 if other major emitters do their fair
share (Council of the EU: Presidency Conclusions 7224, 2007).
Slowing global warming requires large reductions in GHG emissions. Be-
cause CO2 is a stock pollutant that mixes perfectly and has a long atmospheric
lifetime, climate change is a global problem. The Stern Review from 2006 gave
a thorough analysis of the economic costs and consequences of climate change.
Some of the assumptions made in this report are, however, much debated. Es-
pecially the choice of how to evaluate the future, where Stern has chosen a low
discount factor. Nordhaus (2007, chapter IX), for instance, has done similar
calculations with a more conventional choice of discount factor, leading to less
dramatic results. The Stern review does, however, give a picture of the im-
portance of action towards climate change. According to the estimates in this
1http://www.ec.gc.ca/Publications/default.asp?lang=En&n=EE4F06AE-1&xml
=EE4F06AE-13EF-453B-B633-FCB3BAECEB4F&o¤set=3&toc=show
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review, the cost of inaction is around 5 percent of global GDP every year, but
uncertainty about the risks of climate change might increase this sum to be as
large as 20 percent. On the other hand, Stern argues that the costs of reducing
emissions to avoid the worst consequences of climate change can be limited to 1
percent of world GDP per year if starting now. Furthermore, combating climate
change through reducing emissions also creates business opportunities through
new markets related to low-carbon technologies, which is one of the four ele-
ments Stern suggests that a future climate framework should consist of. The
other three are emission trading, action on reducing deforestation, and prepa-
ration for adaption in countries that are vulnerable to climate change (Stern,
2006).
Regulations to avoid serious consequences from climate change requires in-
ternational cooperation and coordination. Politically this means that no nation,
acting alone, will have much impact on the possible solutions to the problem.
Every country involved must have condence that other countries are willing
to make comparable e¤orts (Victor, 2011). Victor (2011) argues that the in-
su¢ cient progress in nding sustainable solutions to the challenges of global
warming rst and foremost stems from the lack of a workable policy strategy.
He claims that one of the main reasons is the way the current climate diplomacy
is carried out, with a focus on strict emissions reduction targets and binding
timeframes, and suggests that new approaches are needed. He argues that the
focus should be driven away from "targets and timetables", and places a heavier
weight on the importance of technology policies and smaller groups of cooper-
ation in order to nd a sustainable solution to one of the greatest challenges in
history.
Barrett (2005) has another approach for explaining the challenges to nding
a sustainable solution to the climate problem. His approach is that the cur-
rent climate challenge can be regarded as a global governance problem where
all countries share a global environmental resource - clean air, clean oceans etc.
Collective wellbeing will increase if all countries cooperate in managing these re-
sources, but every individual country will have an incentive to free-ride. Due to
the free-rider problem, countries will have a motivation to develop institutions to
increase cooperation in managing their shared environmental resource and thus
increase collective welfare. One important feature of international agreements is,
however, the principle of national sovereignty. Because of national sovereignty,
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no supra-national power can enforce nations to comply with rules and regula-
tions. National states choose independently whether to sign an agreement or
not, and whether to withdraw from the agreement or remain a signatory. Since
an agreement between nations cannot be legally binding, non-cooperative game
theory is the proper tool for modelling International Environmental Agreements
(IEAs).
As both Stern (2006) and Victor (2011) suggest, one important feature of
future climate negotiations should be to develop low-carbon technologies. The
purpose of this thesis is therefore to investigate how this can be implemented in
a game-theoretical framework. The particular model I will use is the coalition
model on IEAs introduced by Scott Barrett in 1994. Barretts model is often
cited in the literature of IEAs, and can be regarded as a benchmark model within
this eld. The model assumes symmetric nations, meaning that they have equal
costs and benets of pollution abatement, and the setup is a three-stage game.
In stage one, the countries decide whether or not to join the coalition. In
stage two, the signatory countries jointly decide their optimal level of pollution
abatement by maximizing their collective net benets of abatement, followed
by the abatement decision of the singletons outside the coalition in stage 3,
which maximize their individual net benets of pollution abatement. Barrett
(1994) argues that overcoming the free-rider problem is the main di¢ culty in
constructing a functional climate coalition. When the gains to cooperation are
large, the incentive to free-ride is large, and few countries will choose to sign
the agreement. Conversely, when there is little to gain from cooperation, the
incentive to free-ride is low, and a coalition is relatively easy to achieve. The
climate challenge is clearly of the rst kind, with large potential benets from
cooperation, resulting in a low number of signatories to the IEA. The model
will be thoroughly explained in chapter 3.
I extend Barretts model by introducing strategic investments in Research
and Development (R&D) to develop a technology that reduces the cost of abate-
ment for all countries. The point of departure is an "enthusiastic" country that
acts as a frontrunner country with regards to investments in R&D. The term
"enthusiastic" is inspired by Victor (2011), which uses the term to character-
ize countries with higher economic and administrative abilities. Here, it also
expresses a country with a higher level of human capital, which is necessary
to develop this cost-reducing technology. There is only one enthusiastic coun-
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try, which can be thought of as the country with the lowest investment cost
for developing a cost-reducing abatement technology. The questions to be in-
vestigated are, rst, the incentives this country has to develop a cost-reducing
technology. Second, how a lower cost of pollution abatement a¤ects the optimal
abatement levels in the respective countries, and nally, how this a¤ects the
size of the stable coalition. The analysis shows that a country that has the
possibility to invest in a cost-reducing technology should, and will actually, do
so. This will lead to a Pareto improvement in terms of increased welfare for all
countries, including the investing country. There are two mechanisms leading
to this result. A lower cost of pollution abatement will lead to a higher optimal
level of abatement in all countries. It will further lead to increased cooperation,
meaning that more countries will choose to maximize their collective payo¤,
rather than their individual net benets of pollution abatement.
The theoretical expressions derived in this thesis are challenging to analyze.
Therefore the main results arise in the numerical analysis, which is based on the
numerical testing in Barrett (1994). In the model there are ten countries. These
can be regarded as the ten major emitters of GHGs, but it can also picture the
world as ten regions.
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2 Literature Overview
The purpose of this thesis is not to do a literature search. However, it is useful
to look at some studies within the scope of IEAs to understand some of the
strenghts and limitations of the model this thesis is based on, which is the one
Barrett introduced in the paper "Self-Enforcing International Environmental
Agreements" in 1994.
In the paper "International environmental agreements among asymmetric
nations" by Matthew McGinty (2007), the main focus is on what he describes
as "the convenient, but highly unrealistic assumption, that nations are identi-
cal" (McGinty, 2007, p. 45). He criticizes Barrett for having too pessimistic
conclusions, on the basis that the free-rider problem increases as the gains from
constructing an IEA rises. By including a trading scheme, based on permits,
and the possibility that marginal benets and costs may di¤er among countries,
the results are altered. Permits allow the nations to meet their mitigation tar-
gets cost-e¢ ciently. Through numerical simulations of 20 asymmetric nations he
shows that an IEA can achieve substantial reductions in emissions, compared to
the non-cooperative outcome, even when there are large gains from cooperation.
These results are impossible when assuming symmetric countries and empha-
sizes the importance of transfers. Parts of the free-rider problem can therefore be
overcome and a higher level of pollution abatement can be achieved by an IEA.
The picture is thus not as grim as the one presented in Barrett (1994) when the
assumption of symmetry among countries is relaxed. However, agreeing upon a
transfer-system that satises all the countries involved in the negotiations will
also create challenges, and limit the potential for nding a solution.
Barrett (2006) concludes pessimistically when analyzing "Climate Treaties
and "Breakthrough" Technologies". He investigates an alternative treaty to the
Kyoto Protocol which is presented as a system of two treaties. The focus in
the rst treaty is cooperative R&D on developing a breakthrough technology,
while the other promotes collective adoption of this technology. The setup of
the game is such that the R&D phase precedes the coalition formation. Then
the signatory countries choose whether to adopt the technology, followed by
the choice of adoption in the non-signatory countries. Two types of technolo-
gies are considered; a type Y technology, which generates zero-emissions, and a
type X technology, which exhibits increasing returns to adoption, meaning that
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the more countries adopt the technology, the higher will be the gain of imple-
menting it. Once a certain amount of countries have adopted the technology,
it will also be benecial for the remaining countries to adopt it. He reaches
the conclusion that breakthrough technologies will only be benecial in the con-
text of increasing returns, because otherwise the costs exceed the benets, since
the self-enforcing coalition usually consists of a low number of signatories. A
treaty design that includes collective nancing of R&D and adoption of the X-
technology can thus sustain greater cooperation. However, the price to pay to
increasing cooperation in these types of IEAs might be a system that is not cost-
e¢ cient, because in a world characterized by technological lock-in, it cannot be
assumed that the markets choose the best technologies. Also, he concludes that
a technology that satises the properties of the type X technology might not
exist.
A similar analysis is done by Hoel and de Zeeuw (2010) that also investigate
whether a focus on breakthrough technologies can improve the performance of
IEAs. They introduce that the adoption cost of a technology vary with the
level of R&D, and show that it might lead to a larger stable coalition and in-
creased average welfare. There is a trade-o¤ between R&D costs and adoption
costs, meaning that the more is invested, the lower is the cost of implementing
the technology. All countries are assumed identical. The decision of joining
the coalition or not precede the choice of investments and adoption, and the
R&D-costs are borne by the coalition, and not by an individual country. They
show that cooperation is not a necessary condition for achieving su¢ cient R&D
investments in technology development. However, a coalition may be necessary
to prevent under- or overinvestments. The non-cooperative outcome may thus
lead to a su¢ ciently high level of R&D, which is a public good, to induce full
adoption of the technology. An IEA will, however, do better, since it can invest
more to further lower the cost of adoption, or the treaty can prevent overin-
vestments in R&D. Finally, they conclude, with a more optimistic result than
Barrett (2006), that IEAs can achieve more by focusing on R&D investments
rather than emission reductions.
In a recent paper published by Johannes Urpelainen (2012) a game-theoretic
model of strategic technology development is presented. The model is structured
as a three-stage game. In stage one each country decides on technology devel-
opment. In stage two, the countries that did not develop decide on adoption,
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while the countries that did develop in stage one automatically adopt the tech-
nology. Finally, in stage three, all countries simultaneously decide on mitigation.
Technology development and adoption thus precede the abatement decision. In
the model, the cost of R&D varies across countries, and the cost of developing
a technology that reduces the cost of mitigation is lowest in the frontrunner
countries. Further, if the cost of adoption is relatively cheap, compared to the
cost of R&D, strategic technology development will result in a large number of
potential adopters. The analysis depend on two important conditions. First,
some frontrunner countries must have low costs of developing the technology,
and, second, a group of potential adopters must exist. If so, strategic technology
development can lead to global di¤usion and increased mitigation. The results
thus suggest that strategic technology development by frontrunner countries
might enable greater cooperation in combating climate change.
As expressed in the introduction, this thesis focuses on the incentives to
invest in R&D to develop cost-reducing technologies and the e¤ects this has on
the coalition formation and the abatement decision of the respective countries.
It does, in contrast to McGinty (2007), assume that the countries are symmetric
with regards to costs and benets of pollution abatement. A natural extension
would be to include the possibility for asymmetries between countries. This is,
however, not in the scope of this thesis. In contrast to Barrett (2006), Hoel and
de Zeeuw (2010) and Urpelainen (2012), there is only one country that invests in
R&D to develop a cost-reducing abatement technology in the model presented
in this thesis. Also, the investment decision precedes the coalition formation.
In this way, the pure e¤ects of a lower cost of abatement are revealed. All
countries are also assumed to adopt the cost-reducing abatement technology
before the choice of whether or not to join the coalition, and there are no cost of
adoption included in the model. The investment cost is borne by one country,
and the analysis shows that if a country has the possibility to develop this cost-
reducing abatement technology it will actually do so, because it will pay o¤
in a higher net benet for all countries, including the country that bears the
investment costs. This is due to two e¤ects. First, the optimal abatement level
will increase for all countries. Second, the stable coalition will expand, meaning
that more countries will maximize joint net benets rather than their individual
net benets of pollution abatement. The model will be thoroughly explained
below.
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3 A Model of an International Environmental
Agreement
The model I will use as a basis for my analysis throughout this Master the-
sis is based on the one Scott Barrett develops in the paper Self-Enforcing
International Environmental Agreements (1994). The model is one in which
the number of signatories, the terms of the agreement and the actions of the
non-signatory countries are all determined endogenously. The decisions can be
regarded as taken by representatives acting like social planners for each country
(Finus, 2008). Signatory countries will maximize their collective net benets of
pollution abatement, while non-signatory countries each maximize their indi-
vidual payo¤ of pollution abatement.
There are i =2 f1; :::; Ng symmetric countries, all of which have an in-
creasing and concave benet-function of pollution abatement and an increasing
convex cost-function of abatement. Each countrys net benet function is known
by all countries. The choice-variable is restricted to pollution abatement, with
Q dened as global abatement, where Q=
P
i
qi, and qi is the abatement of
country i. A country i earns benet from its own abatement, but also from the
pollution abatement undertaken by the other countries (Barrett, 1994).
The benet-function of country i is dened as
Bi(Q) =
b
N
(aQ  Q
2
2
) (1)
where B(Q)>0 for a>Q and B(Q)<0 for a<Q. The parameter a denes
the level of abatement at which the benet is largest, or where the marginal-
benet goes from being positive to negative. B(Q)<0 for all Q, so the benet
is a decreasing function of the abatement-level. The benet-function is thus
only meaningful for values of Q<a. The parameter b is a multiplier, saying
something about the size of the benet as such. The higher is b the larger is
the benet from abatement.
The cost-function of each country i is
Ci(qi) =
cq2i
2
(2)
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which is an increasing convex function of the abatement-level. The more a
country abates its emissions, the more expensive it becomes to increase the level
of abatement by one unit, so C 0i(qi) > 0; C
00
i (qi) > 0: The parameter c gives the
slope of each countrys marginal cost curve.
3.1 Benchmarks: No Cooperation and Full Cooperation
Before analyzing the equilibrium of the model, the non-cooperative and full
cooperative outcomes will be evaluated. These are useful bechmarks to consider
the limitations and possibilities from creating IEAs.
3.1.1 Non-Cooperative Outcome
The non-cooperative solution can be regarded as the benchmark for the worst-
case scenario, where the countries fail to reach an agreement on reducing emis-
sions of GHGs. In the non-cooperative case every individual country maximizes
its own net benet of pollution abatement, not taking into account that their
level of abatement a¤ects the other countrieswelfare positively. Every indi-
vidual country i thus maximize their individual payo¤, solving the following
maximization problem:
max
qi
(
b
N
(a
X
i
qi   1
2
(
X
i
qi)
2)  1
2
cq2i
)
(3)
The rst order condition for this maximization problem is
ba
N
  b
P
qi
N
  cqi = 0 (4)
Since all countries are assumed identical (qi = qj), the optimal non-cooperative
abatement level for an individual country i is
q0 =
a
N(1 + cb )
(5)
The global optimal non-cooperative level of abatement will be the sum of
every individual countrys optimal level, Q0 = Nq0 :
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Q0 =
a
(1 + cb )
(6)
The marginal benet of the rst unit of pollution abatement in the non-
cooperative outcome is abN , which is where the marginal benet curve crosses
the vertical axis in gure 1. The marginal benet of the ath unit is zero, which
is where the marginal benet curve of the non-cooperative outcome crosses the
horizontal axis in gure 1. The non-cooperative level of pollution abatement
depends positively on the parameters a and b; and negatively on the marginal
abatement cost c, meaning that @Q0=@a > 0; @Q0=@b > 0; @Q0=@c < 0: So if
a increases, the peak of the benet-function moves to the right, trigging the
optimal abatement-level to increase. If b increases, the benet of abatement
increases for all levels of abatement, which also yields a higher optimal level of
abatement, everything else equal. If the cost of abatement increases, the net
benet of abatement decreases, resulting in a lower optimal level of abatement.
3.1.2 Full Cooperative Outcome
The full cooperative outcome, which is what the countries should aim for, is
such that joint welfare is maximized, and every individual country i abates its
emissions of GHGs at the level which is collectively optimal. The full coopera-
tive outcome is found by maximizing joint net benets of pollution abatement,
solving the following maximization problem:
max
qi

b
N
(aNqi   1
2
(Nqi)
2)  1
2
cqi
2

(7)
Each country thus takes into account the benets of its abatement on all the
other countries. The rst order condition of the above maximization problem
is:
ba  bNqi   cqi = 0 (8)
The optimal abatement level for an individual country i under full cooper-
ation, with qi = qj ; will thus be
qc =
a
(N + cb )
(9)
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giving an aggregated optimal full cooperative level of abatement equal to
Qc = Nqc :
Qc =
aN
(N + cb )
(10)
In the full cooperative outcome, the marginal benet of the rst unit of
pollution abatement is equal to ab, which is where the marginal benet curve
crosses the vertical axis in gure 1. As in the non-cooperative outcome the
marginal benet of the ath unit is equal to zero. We easily see that also the full
cooperative level of abatement depends positively on a and b and negatively on
c, hence @Qc=@a > 0; @Qc=@b > 0; @Qc=@c < 0:
As expected, the global optimal full cooperative level of abatement is larger
than the global optimal non-cooperative level of abatement, Qc > Q0, as shown
in gure 1. If all countries set the full cooperative abatement level they will be
better o¤ compared to if they all set the non-cooperative abatement level. This
will become clear in the numerical example in chapter 3.4.
Figure 1: This gure illustrates the two benchmark cases - the abatement level
in the full cooperative and non-cooperative outcomes.
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The result of international negotiations on environmental problems is, how-
ever, not limited to full cooperation or no cooperation. Partial cooperation is
also a possible, and probably, more realistic outcome. However, this equilib-
rium is incomplete, meaning that the countries would do better if all countries
cooperated. In this sense, a self-enforcing IEA can be compared to a Prisoners
dilemma game, because the full cooperative equilibrium is usually not stable,
as will be shown in the following sections (Perman et al, 2011).
3.2 Self-Enforcing IEAs
The N countries in the model all su¤er from a common externality problem,
which is GHG emissions, and are thus potential signatories to an IEA on pollu-
tion abatement. The outcome of an international treaty on climate improvement
is a public good, which then also gives an incentive for free-riding. Countries
that do not sign the agreement benet from the pollution abatement undertaken
by the signatory countries, without bearing the costs. There are two types of
free-riding: not to participate in the IEA, and not to comply with the obligations
agreed upon in the agreement (Finus, 2008).
First, the countries must choose whether or not to sign the agreement. Then,
the countries decide upon the terms of the IEA. These will consist of a set of
pollution abatement levels undertaken by the signatory countries, depending on
how many countries that choose to sign the agreement (Perman et al, 2011).
The terms of the agreement are such that the optimal level of abatement
in the signatory countries is derived by maximizing the coalitions joint net
benet of pollution abatement, while a non-signatory maximizes the countrys
individual payo¤ function. The decision of joining the coalition or not is hence a
choice of which objective function to maximize, which lead to di¤erent optimal
levels of abatement. The coalition acts as a single player, while the non-signatory
countries act as singletons. The countries can thus be regarded as symmetric
ex-ante, with regards to costs and benets of pollution abatement. However,
ex-post, the countries receive di¤erent payo¤s depending on if they choose to
enter the agreement or not (Finus, 2008).
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If an additional country decides to accede to the treaty, the number of sig-
natory countries will increase, and thus also the signatoriesabatement level.
Conversely, if a country withdraws from the agreement, there will be a lower
number of signatories, and the optimal decision for the signatory countries,
which maximize the coalitions collective net benets of pollution abatement,
is to lower their level of abatement. These constitutes a set of penalties and
rewards reecting the signatory countriesabatement decision as a function of
the number of countries signing the treaty (Perman et al, 2011).
If the terms of the IEA gives incentives for the N countries, both the signatory-
and the non-signatory countries, to hold on to their decision once the agreement
has come into place, the treaty is self-enforcing. A self-enforcing agreement must
be renegotiation proof, meaning that there is no incentive to renegotiate the
agreement once it has come into place. The second type of free-riding, namely
not to comply with the obligations of the agreement, is hence absent in a self-
enforcing IEA. This is why the full cooperative outcome is usually not stable,
since one or more countries will gain a higher payo¤ by withdrawing from the
agreement compared to the payo¤ they earn by remaining a signatory (Perman
et al, 2011).
An IEA is self-enforcing if the conditions of internal and external stability
are met. The coalition is internally stable if no signatory country can gain a
higher payo¤ by unilaterally leaving the coalition, and externally stabile if no
non-signatory can earn a higher payo¤ by acceding to the agreement. These
payo¤ functions will be derived in the following chapter. Letting s and n
denote the payo¤ for the signatory and non-signatory countries respectively,
and dening the share of countries signing the IEA as ; the payo¤s, s and n;
will be functions of : The coalition consisting of N countries is self-enforcing
if (Barrett, 1994)
n(  1
N
) 6 s() (11)
and
n() 1 s(+
1
N
) (12)
In open membership games like the Kyoto-agreement, where all nations can
join the IEA, both the above equations must be satised. It might, however, be
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such that the agreement is exclusive, and existing members can block the entry
of new members. If so, only the internal stability condition must be satised
(McGinty, 2007).
Self-enforcing IEAs typically exist of a relatively small number of countries,
giving little improvement compared to the non-cooperative case. Barrett (2003)
argues that when the gains to cooperation are small, meaning that the di¤erence
between global net benets of pollution abatement under the non-cooperative
and full cooperative outcome is small, an IEA may achieve a high degree of
cooperation. However, the larger the benets from joining the IEA, the lower
will be the participation level. Furthermore, a self-enforcing IEA can consist
of many signatories, if only the cost-benet ratio, cb , is small. Barrett (1994)
demonstrates that if cb is small, the di¤erence between global net benets under
the full cooperative and non-cooperative outcomes will also be small, meaning
that IEAs signed by many countries do not increase global net benets by much,
compared to the non-cooperative outcome. The gains to free-riding are therefore
also small. In gure 1 this can be regarded as if the marginal cost curve was
relatively at. This suggests that IEAs signed by a large number of countries do
only have marginal e¤ects. If the cost-benet ratio, cb ; is large, the marginal cost
curve in gure 1 will be steep, and the di¤erence between global net benets
under the full cooperative and non-cooperative outcomes will be large. In this
case, there is more to gain by free-riding, and less countries will choose to sign
the agreement on reducing their emissions of GHGs, even though the gains
from full cooperation are larger. How much an IEA may improve on the non-
cooperative outcome in this model depends crucially the parameter values. This
will be analyzed more in detail in the numerical examples throughout this thesis.
Global warming is a challenge for which the benets from cooperation are
substantial. Also the costs are large, so one can regard the parameter values
b and c as large, as well as the number of countries, N . Barrett (1994) argues
that when both b and c are large, the di¤erence between net benets under
full cooperation compared to the non-cooperative solution is large. However,
few countries will then choose to sign the agreement. This is bad news for the
environment, since the problems the world faces today is a challenge for which
global participation is necessary to be able to reach a sustainable solution.
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3.3 Modelling the Self-Enforcing IEA
The share of countries signing the IEA is dened as , meaning that there
are N signatory countries and (1  )N non-signatory countries. Subscript n
expresses non-signatory countries, while subscript s denotes signatory countries
behavior. Since the countries are symmetric, aggregated abatement of non-
signatory countries will beQn = (1 )Nqn, and likewise for signatory countries;
Qs = Nqs. The decisions are made sequentially, and there are three stages in
the game:
Stage 1: The countries decide whether or not to join the agreement.
Stage 2: The signatory countries choose their optimal level of abatement by
maximizing their aggregate net benets of pollution abatement.
Stage 3: The non-signatories choose their optimal level of abatement by
maximizing their individual net benets of abatement.
Barrett (1994) models the IEA as a stage game, where decisions are made
sequentially. The signatory countries act as Stackelberg leaders making the
rst move, followed by the move of the non-signatories. The choices made
are, however, inter-dependent, meaning that the signatory countries will take
into account how the non-signatories will react when making their rst move
(Barrett, 2005). The game is solved by using backward induction, starting by
solving for stage three. This will give the non-signatoriesoptimal abatement
level for any level of pollution abatement in the signatory countries. Hence,
the strategic reaction of the outsiders is taken into account when the coalition
chooses its optimal abatement level in the second stage (Finus, 2008). A non-
signatory country will thus
max
qn

b
N
(aQ  1
2
Q2)  1
2
cq2n

(13)
The rst order condition of this maximization problem is
b
N
(a Q)  cqn = 0 (14)
which further, by inserting for Q = Qs +Qn, can be written as
a Qs  Qn = Ncqn
b
(15)
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With qn =
Qn
(1 )N ; the best response function for the non-signatory coun-
tries, given the abatement undertaken by the signatories, is
Qn(;Qs) =
(1  )(a Qs)
( cb + 1  )
(16)
From this best response function we see that the optimal level of abatement
in the non-signatory countries depends negatively on the level of abatement in
the signatory countries, so @Qn@Qs < 0. The higher the signatory countries set their
level of abatement, the lower will be the level of abatement in the non-signatory
countries. The signatory countries takes this into account when deciding their
optimal level of abatement in the second stage. This implies that a degree of
carbon leakage is internalized in this model, since it is modelled as a Stackelberg
game and not as a Nash equilibrium (Finus, 2008).
The signatory countries maximize their collective net benets, subject to
equation (16). The abatement decision for a signatory country is hence found
by solving the following maximization problem:
max
qs

N
b
N

a(Qs +Qn(Qs))  1
2
(Qs +Qn(Qs))
2

  N 1
2
cq2s

(17)
The corresponding rst order condition is
b
N

a

dQs
dqs
+
@Qn
@Qs
dQs
dqs

  (Qs +Qn(Qs))

dQs
dqs
+
@Qn
@Qs
dQs
dqs

  cqs = 0
(18)
Inserting the explicit functions of the derivatives, and qs =
Qs
N ; with qs iden-
tical for all the coalition-members, the optimal abatement level for the coalition
is
Qs() =
ac2N
b
2Nc
b + (
c
b + 1  )2
(19)
Inserting equation (19) into (16) gives the optimal level of abatement in the
non-signatory countries:
Qn() =
a(1  )( cb + 1  )
2Nc
b + (
c
b + 1  )2
(20)
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Equation (19) and (20) give the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium abatement-
levels, meaning the abatement prole that serves both types of countries best,
given the strategy of the other type of countries.
If an additional country joins the IEA, increasing N; the optimal behavior
of the signatory countries is to increase their total abatement-level. This can be
shown by di¤erentiating Qs with respect to  :
@Qs
@
=
2aNc
b
 
c
b + 1  
  
c
b + 1
h
2Nc
b +
 
c
b + 1  
2i2 > 0 (21)
Conversely, if a country withdraws from the IEA, the optimal policy for the
remaining signatories is to reduce their abatement-level, which also means that
the non-signatories will increase their abatement level:
@Qn
@
=
 acb
h 
c
b + 1  
2
+ N
 
2( cb + 1  )  cb
i
h
2Nc
b +
 
c
b + 1  
2i2 < 0 (22)
Since the terms of the agreement are that the coalition always maximizes
the collective net benets of pollution abatement, the optimal response for the
coalition when a country withdraws is to lower their level of abatement, since
there are now less signatories to the IEA, which is shown analytically in equation
(21), with @Qs@ > 0. The optimal response for the non-signatory countries is then
to increase their level of pollution abatement, @Qn@ < 0. This can be regarded as
a credible punishment for the country that leaves the coalition, since the gains
from free-riding then are reduced.
3.4 Numerical Example
Barrett (1994), gives a numerical example to better understand the concept of
a self-enforcing IEA. He chooses the following parameter values; a=100, b=1,
c=0,25 and N=10, and shows that the only stable coalition consists of four
countries, namely that  = 0; 4: For  = 0; 4; both the internal- and external
stability conditions are met, meaning that n(   1N ) 6 s() and n() 1
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 qs qn s n Q 
0 - 8,0 - 472,0 80,0 4720,0
0,1 1,9 8,5 476,8 468,1 78,7 4690,0
0,2 4,2 8,7 474,0 466,6 78,2 4681,2
0,3 6,7 8,4 472,3 468,9 78,9 4699,4
0,4 8,9 7,6 472,2 474,9 81,1 4738,1
0,5 10,5 6,3 473,7 482,5 84,2 4781,2
0,6 11,3 4,9 476,4 489,4 87,7 4815,9
0,7 11,5 3,6 479,5 494,3 91,0 4839,8
0,8 11,1 2,5 482,7 497,3 93,8 4855,9
0,9 10,5 1,6 485,4 498,8 95,9 4867,9
1 9,8 - 487,8 - 97,6 4878,0
Table 1: The table shows the relationship between the size of the coalition, the
optimal levels of abatement and the welfare levels.
s(+
1
N ): Non-signatories hence earn a greater payo¤ by entering the coalition
whenever  < 0; 4; and signatories do better by withdrawing from the agreement
whenever  > 0; 4: The results are shown in table 1.
Even though the decision of joining the coalition is a one-shot decision, it is
helpful, for understanding the mechanism, to think of it sequentially. The results
are outlined in table 2. Suppose that initially one country decides to join the
coalition. Then, the next country can choose between signing the IEA and get
payo¤ s( = 0; 2) = 474 or not to sign, and get payo¤ n( = 0; 1) = 468; 1:
This country will choose the higher payo¤ and therefore choose to sign the IEA.
The third country can now choose between joining the coalition, increasing the
size of the coalition to three countries, and get payo¤ s( = 0; 3) = 472; 3; or
not signing and get payo¤ n( = 0; 2) = 466; 6: Again, the country will choose
to sign, since s( = 0; 3) > n( = 0; 2): Further, the fourth country can
choose to sign the agreement and get payo¤ s( = 0; 4) = 472; 2 or not to and
get payo¤ n( = 0; 3) = 468; 9: Again, signing the agreement, increasing the
size of the coalition to four countries, gives the country higher payo¤ compared
to not signing. The fth country, however, has the choice between acceding the
agreement and earn a payo¤ of s( = 0; 5) = 473; 7 and not acceding and earn
a payo¤ of n( = 0; 4) = 474; 9: This country will hence not accede to the
agreement, since s( = 0; 5) < n( = 0; 4): The same will be the case for the
last ve countries, that will choose not to sign, since the payo¤ of remaining a
non-signatory, when there are already four signatory countries to the agreement,
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 n() s(+ 1N ) n(-
1
N) s()
0 472,0 - 476,6 -
0,1 468,1 474,0 472,0 476,8
0,2 466,6 472,3 468,1 474,0
0,3 468,9 472,2 466,6 472,3
0,4 474,9 473,7 468,9 472,2
0,5 482,5 476,4 474,9 473,7
0,6 489,4 479,5 482,5 476,4
0,7 494,3 482,7 489,4 479,5
0,8 497,3 485,4 494,3 482,7
0,9 498,8 487,8 497,3 485,4
1 - 489,7 - 487,8
Table 2: The table shows the calculations of the internal and external stability
conditions.
yields a higher payo¤ than acceding the treaty and maximize aggregate payo¤.
The same logic can be applied in the reversed case, with the full cooperative
case as the point of departure, following the two last columns in table 2. If
one country initially withdraws from the agreement, the next country has the
choice between remaining a signatory and earn payo¤ s( = 0; 9) = 485; 4,
or to withdraw from the agreement and get payo¤ n( = 0; 8) = 497; 3: It
will thus withdraw, since the payo¤ from leaving the agreement and pursue its
individually rational policy, is greater than the payo¤ it earns by remaining a
signatory and maximize the coalitions aggregated net benets. This will be the
case until six countries have withdrawn from the agreement. When the coalition
is made up of four countries, a remaining signatory has the choice between
staying in the coalition and earn payo¤ s( = 0; 4) = 472; 2; or withdrawing
and earn payo¤ n( = 0:3) = 468; 9: The country will then remain a signatory,
since s( = 0; 4) > n( = 0:3):
Hence, the self-enforcing IEA does, with the above parameter values, consist
of four countries. We see, from table 1, that the global net benets, dened as
 = Ns+(1 )Nn increase as the size of the coalition increases, but that
the IEA consisting of four countries is the only stable IEA.
Testing this with lower abatement costs, all other parameter values equal,
I nd that the stable coalition increases when c decreases. When c decreases,
the cost-benet ratio cb becomes smaller, and the di¤erence between global net
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c  Q 
0,25 0,4 81,1 4738,1
0,15 0,5 87,8 4867,2
0,1 0,6 91,8 4910,6
0,05 0,8 96,7 4970,7
Table 3: As the cost-parameter, c, declines, the stable coaltion expands. Ag-
gregated abatement and welfare increase.
benets under the non-cooperative and full cooperative outcome decreases. As
stated earlier, the IEA then achieves a higher degree of cooperation. With
c = 0; 15, the stable size of the coalition increases to ve countries. If c = 0; 1,
the stable coalition consists of six countries, and if c is 0; 05, the stable coalition-
size increases to eight countries. The total world welfare thus increases as c
decreases. Table 3 shows how the stable size of the coalition, the total pollution
abatement and the total welfare increase as c declines. This is obviously because
the cost of pollution abatement is lower for all countries, but also because more
pollution abatement is undertaken as the size of the stable coalition increases,
since more countries maximize joint welfare. This relationship between the
cost-parameter, c; and the stable size of the coalition is presented graphically in
gure 2.
If the cost of abatement decreases, the size of the stable coalition will in-
crease, and the agreement can achieve more relative to the initial situation with
a higher cost of abatement. However, for this to be the case, one or more coun-
tries must be willing to invest in a technology that lowers the cost of abatement
for all countries. This is not analyzed before and will be elaborated in the
following chapter.
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Figure 2: The size of the stable coalition increases as the cost of abatement, c,
declines, all other parameter values equal.
4 An Enthusiastic Investment
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
and the Kyoto Protocol emphasize that developed countries should contribute
more than developing countries in combating climate change. The developed
countries are, to a large extent, responsible for the current high levels of GHGs
in the atmosphere after more than 150 years of industrial activity, followed by
corresponding economic growth. The UNFCCC thus places a heavier burden on
industrialized nations under the principle "common but di¤erentiated responsi-
bilities and respective capabilities" (UNFCCC, 1992, Article 3).
Victor (2011) divides the world into two subgroups of countries. The rst
consists of enthusiastic countries, which are willing and able to spend their
own resources on combating climate change. The other group, the reluctant
countries, have di¤erent priorities and less developed administrative systems to
control polluting activities. Building on this further, one can regard several
developed nations, in particular European and Scandinavian countries, as fron-
trunners, belonging to the group Victor (2011) names enthusiastic countries.
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These are in a unique position both economically and with regards to human
capital to engender a sustainable solution when it comes to carbon emissions,
which also brings about a moral obligation to lead by example in this area.
It is understood that GHG emissions could be reduced by lowering produc-
tion and therefore economic growth. This in highly undesirable. However, lower
growth may not be a necessary condition for a more responsible level of GHG
emissions. More e¢ cient production, realized through an improvement in tech-
nology, could facilitate current of even elevated levels of economic growth, while
keeping emissions stable or even driving them lower.
Even though the countries in the model presented in this thesis are symmet-
ric with regards to costs and benets of pollution abatement, I will base the
further analysis on the assumption that they are asymmetric in their ability to
invest in R&D. This asymmetry can be regarded as, for instance, a di¤erent
historical focus on educational policies, which have led to lower costs of tech-
nology development in some countries. The costs of developing cost reducing
technologies are thus prohibitively high in the countries which lack this histor-
ical emphasis on education. I will use the argument above - that developed
nations should contribute more than developing ones - to motivate the further
analysis. The focus will be on strategic R&D investments to promote a low cost
abatement technology.
Suppose that a country invests in a technology that lowers the cost of abate-
ment for all countries. This country, which I will call the "enthusiastic country",
has the possibility to invest to "save for all". Victor (2011) uses the term "en-
thusiastic" to describing a country with higher economic and administrative
capacity. Here, the term "enthusiastic" is also a result of a historically larger
focus on education, research and development, leading to a higher level of human
capital.
In this model, there is only one "enthusiastic" country, which can be re-
garded as the country with the lowest technology development cost, and hence
the strongest incentive to invest. Assuming that this country is a developed
country, with a moral obligation to contribute to solving the climate threat, it
will not impose any intellectual property rights (IPR) on the innovation, and
the technology is free to acquire for the remaining countries.
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The enthusiastic country is not willing to develop a cost reducing technology
if it does not lead to implementation in the other countries. This sheds light on
the importance of the strategic e¤ects of technology development. Further, this
can be regarded as the "common but di¤erentiated responsibilities" expressed
in the UNFCCC. The enthusiastic country has the possibility, and hence a re-
sponsibility, to invest to "save for all", but the remaining countries then have
the responsibility of implementing the technology. So, either we have an equilib-
rium such that no development occurs, or an equilibrium where the technology
is developed and implemented by all countries.
Also, if the enthusiastic country invests, it will also participate in the coali-
tion. This supports the notion "enthusiastic", because not only will the country
invest in R&D and develop the cost reducing technology, it also knows at this
stage that it will be a signatory to the IEA, maximizing the coalitions joint
payo¤ rather than its individual net benets of pollution abatement.
The further analysis is thus based on two key assumptions. First, one fron-
trunner country must have the possibility and willingness to develop a technol-
ogy that reduces the cost of pollution abatement. Second, this technology will
be free to acquire for the rest of the world, and all countries will therefore adopt
and implement this cost-reducing technology.
One necessary condition, which will be proved to be satised, is that both
developers and adopters must benet from the development of the technology.
Since there are no prices included in this model, the adopters naturally benet
from lower abatement costs. However, as will be shown, also the enthusiastic
country will earn higher net benets from the development of the cost-reducing
technology. There are two reasons for this. First, the costs of pollution abate-
ment will be lower. Second, the strategic e¤ects - that all other countries will
undertake more pollution abatement, and more countries will maximize the
coalitions objective function - will lead to greater benets for all the countries,
also the enthusiastic.
The structure of the game is such that the R&D phase and the adoption of
the new technology precede the coalition formation. The enthusiastic country
knows at this point that it will be a signatory to the IEA. It has the same benet
and cost-functions as the other countries, but has more knowledge, which leads
it to develop this cost-reducing technology. After making this technological
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leap, the corresponding technology and know how are free to acquire, and other
countries will copy and implement it. The outline of the game is thus as follows:
Stage 0: The enthusiastic country invests in a technology that lowers the
cost of abatement for all countries. All countries adopt and implement the
technology.
Stage 1: The countries decide whether or not to join the agreement.
Stage 2: The signatory countries choose their optimal level of abatement by
maximizing their aggregate net benets of pollution abatement.
Stage 3: The non-signatories choose their optimal level of abatement by
maximizing their individual net benets of abatement.
The question then becomes; how will this alter the abatement and welfare
levels, along with the stable coalition size.
4.1 The E¤ects of a Lower Cost of Abatement
4.1.1 Full Cooperative Case
We already know that in the full-cooperative solution, with  = 1; a lower cost
of abatement, c, will result in a higher optimal abatement-level. Di¤erentiating
equation (10) with respect to c gives:
@Qc
@c
=
 Nab 
N + cb
2 < 0 (23)
An investment in a technology that lowers the unit cost of abatement, will
consequently pay o¤ in higher abatement-levels in the full-cooperative case. The
total world welfare in the full cooperative case is
c = Nc = N
b
N

aQc   1
2
Q2c

 N 1
2
cq2c (24)
Di¤erentiating this with respect to c yields:
@c
@c
=
 a2N
2
 
N + cb
2 < 0 (25)
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meaning that, when the countries are faced with a lower cost of abatement,
the total welfare will increase.
4.1.2 Non-Cooperative Case
Also in the non-cooperative outcome,  = 0; where the optimal abatement level
is as in equation (6), and all countries maximize individual net benet, a lower
cost of abatement will increase the optimal non-cooperative abatement level:
@Q0
@c
=
 ab 
1 + cb
2 < 0 (26)
Looking at the total welfare in this case with
0 = N0 = N
b
N

aQ0   1
2
Q20

 N 1
2
cq20 (27)
and di¤erentiating this with respect to c gives:
@0
@c
=
 a2  cb (2N   1) + 1
2N
 
1 + cb
3 < 0 (28)
which is also negative, meaning that also in worst case scenario, where there
are no signatories to the agreement, the welfare will increase if the cost of
abatement is reduced.
An investment in a technology that lowers the unit cost of abatement, will
hence pay o¤ in higher abatement levels in both the non-cooperative and the
full cooperative case. Also the global welfare level will increase when the cost
of abatement decreases in these two benchmark cases. Developing the new
technology, on the other hand, has a cost which must be born solely by the
enthusiastic country.
4.1.3 The Self-Enforcing IEA
Now, lets consider how a lower cost of abatement impacts the abatement-levels
for the signatory and the non-signatory countries when the unit cost of abate-
ment decreases in the more realistic case, where there are some countries that
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are signatories to the IEA and other countries remain outside. Here I will look
at the e¤ects for a given size of the coalition.
The optimal levels of abatement in the coalition, Qs; and the non-signatory
countries, Qn; are in the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium according to equa-
tion (19) and (20), respectively. Di¤erentiating (19) with respect to the cost-
parameter, c, for a given size of the coalition gives:
@Qs
@c
=
a2N
b

( cb + 1  )(1    cb )

( cb + 1  )2 + 
2Nc
b
2 (29)
which is positive for  + cb > 1; and negative for  +
c
b < 1; meaning that
when the cost decreases below a certain level, for a given b, the coalition will
decrease their level of abatement when the cost of abatement declines. With
the parameter values used in this thesis, which will be analyzed numerically in
chapter 4.3, the sign of the above equation will always be negative, as long as
the size of the stable coalition is unchanged. This is due to the fact that the
non-signatory countries will increase their optimal level of abatement as the cost
decreases for a given size on the stable coalition, which will be showed below.
The optimal decision for the signatory countries is hence to lower their level of
abatement, as long as the coalition size remains unchanged.
The result for a single coalition member, knowing that
Qs = Nqs; is:
qs (; c) =
ac
b
( cb + 1  )2 + 
2Nc
b
(30)
with
@qs
@c
=
a
b

( cb + 1  )(1    cb )

( cb + 1  )2 + 
2Nc
b
2 (31)
which gives a similar result as above.
The non-signatories will, however, for a given size of the coalition, increase
their abatement-level when the cost of abatement decreases. Di¤erentiating (20)
with respect to c yields:
@Qn
@c
=
 ab (1  )

( cb + 1  )2 + 2N(1  )

( cb + 1  )2 + 2N cb
2 < 0 (32)
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Looking at every single non-signatory, with Qn = (1  )Nqn :
qn(c) =
a
N (
c
b + 1  )
( cb + 1  )2 + 2N cb
(33)
the result for a single non-signatory country of a lower cost of pollution
abatement, for a given size of the stable coalition, is:
@qn
@c
=
  aNb

( cb + 1  )2 + 2N(1  )

( cb + 1  )2 + 2N cb
2 < 0 (34)
For a given size of the stable coalition, the non-signatory countries increase
their abatement when the cost decreases. Therefore, the signatory countries,
which take into account the response from the non-signatory countries, will relax
their optimal level of abatement as the cost of pollution abatement declines. It
is important to emphasize that these results rely on a given size of the stable
coalition.
A decreasing cost of pollution abatement will eventually alter the size of the
stable coalition, which again a¤ect the optimal levels of abatement. This will
be analyzed further in the following chapter.
4.2 Expansion of the Stable Coalition
When the enthusiastic country, which will be a member of the coalition, invests
in a technology that lowers the cost of abatement for all countries, the size of the
stable coalition will eventually increase, meaning that @=@c 6 0: The lower the
cost of abatement, the larger is the stable coalition, all other parameter values
equal. When analyzing how the optimal levels of abatement are a¤ected when
the cost of abatement decreases, the fact that the stable size of the coalition is
altered should also be included.
4.2.1 Signatory Countries
The optimal level of abatement in the coalition is
Qs(c; (c)) =
a(c)2Nc
bh
( cb + 1  (c))2 + (c)
2Nc
b
i (35)
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Including the e¤ect of the cost-parameter c on the size of the stable coalition
; @=@c 6 0; the total e¤ect on the coalitions optimal level of abatement of a
lower cost of abatement is:
@Qs
@c
=
8<: (
2aNc
b
@
@c +
a2N
b )
h
( cb + 1  )2 + 
2Nc
b
i

( cb + 1  )2 + 
2Nc
b
2 (36)
 
a2Nc
b
h
2( cb + 1  )( 1b   @@c ) + 2Ncb @@c + 
2N
b
i

( cb + 1  )2 + 
2Nc
b
2
9=;
The result is ambiguous and depends on if the cost decreases su¢ ciently to
expand the stable coalition. As shown in chapter 4.1.3, the optimal level of
pollution abatement for the coalition is reduced when the cost of abatement
declines, as long as the size of the stable coalition remains unchanged, because
the optimal level of abatement for the non-signatory countries increase as the
cost decreases, for a given size of the stable coalition. However, as the cost
declines su¢ ciently to increasing the stable coalition, the optimal level of abate-
ment for the coalition will increase, both because there will be a larger number
of signatory countries, and because every signatory country will increase the
level of pollution abatement when the stable coalition expands.
Looking at a single signatory country, where the optimal abatement-level is:
qs(c; (c)) =
a(c)c
bh
( cb + 1  (c))2 + (c)
2Nc
b
i (37)
the derivative of equation (37) with respect to c is:
@qs
@c
=
8<: (
ac
b
@
@c +
a
b )
h
( cb + 1  )2 + 
2Nc
b
i

( cb + 1  )2 + 
2Nc
b
2 (38)
 
ac
b
h
2( cb + 1  )( 1b   @@c ) + 2Ncb @@c + 
2N
b
i

( cb + 1  )2 + 
2Nc
b
2
9=;
Again, the result is ambiguous. The intuition is that as long as the cost of
abatement declines to a level that does not alter the size of the stable coalition,
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the optimal level of abatement for a signatory country will decrease when the
cost of abatement decreases. As shown in the previous chapter, this is because
the non-signatory countries will increase their level of abatement as the cost
declines, as long as it does not alter the size of the stable coalition. However,
if the cost decreases su¢ ciently to expanding the stable coalition, the optimal
level of pollution abatement for every single signatory country will increase.
This will be shown in the numerical analysis in chapter 4.3.
4.2.2 Non-Signatory Countries
As shown in chapter 4.1.3, the optimal level of pollution abatement for the
non-signatory countries increases as the cost of abatement declines for a given
size of the coalition. Now, including the e¤ect of that the size of the coalition
eventually changes as the cost of abatement changes, this e¤ect must be included
in the calculations by letting  depend on c, with @=@c 6 0. Looking at the
non-signatory countries, with:
Qn(c; (c)) =
a(1  (c))( cb + 1  (c))
( cb + 1  (c))2 + (c)
2Nc
b
(39)
the derivative of Qn with respect to c, is:
@Qn
@c
=
(
a

( @@c ( cb + 1  ) + (1  )( 1b   @@c ))(( cb + 1  )2 + 2N cb )

( cb + 1  )2 + 2N cb
2
(40)
 a(1  )( cb + 1  )
h
2( cb + 1  )( 1b   @@c ) + 2Ncb @@c + 
2N
b
i

( cb + 1  )2 + 2N cb
2
9=;
It does, however, make more sense to look at how a single non-signatory
country will react to a change in the cost of pollution abatement, since the self-
enforcing coalition will eventually expand when the cost of abatement decreases,
and the number of non-signatory countries will be lower.
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For an individual non-signatory country, with an abatement-level equal to:
qn(c; (c)) =
a
N (
c
b + 1  (c))
( cb + 1  (c))2 + (c)
2Nc
b
(41)
the result is the following:
@qn
@c
=
a
N
@
@c (
c
b + 1  )2   acb

@@c + 2(
c
b + 1  )

( cb + 1  )2 + 2N cb
2 (42)
Also here, the result is ambiguous and depends on if the cost decreases
su¢ ciently to altering the size of the stable coalition. However, as will elaborated
further in the subsequent chapter, the optimal level of abatement of a non-
signatory country will increase as the cost decreases, as long as the stable size
of the coalition remains unchanged. Furthermore, when the cost of pollution
abatement decreases su¢ ciently to increasing the size of the stable coalition,
the optimal level of abatement of the remaining non-signatory countries will
decrease.
In this chapter I have shown how the signatory- and non-signatory coun-
tries will respond to a change in the abatement cost, taking into account that
the stable coalition size will be altered as the abatement cost changes. In the
next chapter I will consider a numerical example, developing Barretts (1994)
original calculations further, before continuing with the investment decision the
enthusiastic country faces.
4.3 Numerical Analysis, Part 2
The stable size of the coalition increases when the cost-parameter, c, decreases.
In the numerical calculations below, the numerical results, outlined in chapter
3.4, are further developed. I have used Barretts (1994) parameter values as a
point of departure, with a = 100, b = 1, and the number of countries, N = 10.
However, I have tested how the game evolves with a lower cost-parameter, c. I
have only looked at the e¤ects of discreet changes in c; so the point at which
the stable coalition increases might, and probably will, be at some values in
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c  qs qn Qs Qn Q s n 
0,25 0,4 8,909 7,572 35,63 45,43 81,07 472,16 474,91 4738,12
0,24 0,4 8,811 7,709 35,24 46,26 81,50 473,57 475,75 4748,78
0,23 0,4 8,705 7,853 34,82 47,12 81,94 474,97 476,60 4759,47
0,22 0,4 8,590 8,005 34,36 48,03 82,39 476,38 477,45 4770,18
0,21 0,5 10,203 6,899 51,02 34,50 85,51 478,57 484,51 4815,40
0,20 0,5 10,101 7,071 50,51 35,35 85,86 479,80 485,00 4824,00
0,19 0,5 9,988 7,255 49,94 36,27 86,22 481,02 485,50 4832,61
0,18 0,5 9,864 7,453 49,32 37,26 86,58 482,24 486,00 4841,24
0,17 0,5 9,727 7,667 48,63 38,33 86,97 483,46 486,51 4849,88
0,16 0,5 9,574 7,899 47,87 39,49 87,36 484,68 487,02 4858,53
0,15 0,5 9,404 8,150 47,02 40,75 87,77 485,89 487,54 4867,19
0,14 0,5 9,215 8,425 46,08 42,13 88,20 487,10 488,07 4875,86
0,13 0,6 10,415 7,077 62,49 28,31 90,80 488,72 492,51 4902,35
0,12 0,6 10,251 7,403 61,50 29,61 91,12 489,75 492,77 4909,56
0,11 0,6 10,059 7,773 60,36 31,09 91,45 490,78 493,02 4916,76
0,10 0,6 9,836 8,197 59,02 32,79 91,80 491,80 493,28 4923,95
0,09 0,6 9,573 8,686 57,44 34,75 92,18 492,82 493,55 4931,12
0,08 0,7 10,440 7,084 73,08 21,25 94,33 494,03 496,39 4947,40
0,07 0,7 10,210 7,710 71,47 23,13 94,60 494,89 496,46 4953,65
0,06 0,7 9,915 8,499 69,41 25,50 94,90 495,75 496,53 4959,85
0,05 0,8 10,458 6,536 83,66 13,07 96,73 496,73 498,40 4970,65
0,04 0,8 10,204 7,653 81,63 15,31 96,94 497,45 498,36 4976,31
0,03 0,8 9,800 9,392 78,40 18,78 97,18 498,16 498,28 4981,86
0,02 0,9 10,204 6,803 91,84 6,80 98,64 498,87 499,44 4989,24
0,01 1 9,990 0,000 99,90 0,00 99,90 499,50 - 4995,00
0,00 1 10,000 0,000 100,00 0,00 100,00 500,00 - 5000,00
Table 4: The table shows the relationship between the cost of abatment, the
stable coalition size and the respective optimal abatement and welfare levels.
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between the values I have considered. This is, however, not important for the
results.
Table 4 shows the relationship between the cost of abatement and the stable
coalition size. Furthermore, it shows how the level of abatement in the signatory
and non-signatory countries, as well as the total abatement, change as the cost
changes. It also expresses how the welfare in the respective countries and the
total welfare depend on c.
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Figure 3: The development in the optimal level of abatement for a single signa-
tory and non-signatory country as the cost of abatement, c! 0:
From table 4, we can read that to increase the stable size of the coalition
from consisting of four signatory countries to ve, the cost of abatement must
decrease from c 2 f0; 25; 0; 22g to c 2 f0; 21; 0; 14g. A further increase in the
stable coalition to consisting of six countries requires the abatement cost to
drop to c 2 f0; 13; 0; 09g, and so on. To reach a stable full cooperative outcome,
 = 1; the cost of abatement must be reduced to c = 0:01:
Looking at a single signatory country, the optimal abatement level, qs;
declines when c decreases, as long as the stable size of the coalition remains
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unchanged, as shown analytically in chapter 4.1.3. The reason behind this re-
sult is that the non-signatory countries increase their level of abatement when
the cost decreases for a given size of the stable coalition. When the cost of abate-
ment declines enough to expanding the stable coalition size with one country,
the optimal level of abatement for a single signatory country increases. As c
declines further, the optimal abatement level for a signatory country decreases
towards the point where the stable coalition again expands to consisting of an
additional country. This pattern explains the ambiguity in the partial deriva-
tives in chapter 4.2.1 and 4.2.2, and is shown graphically in gure 3.
Aggregated abatement, signatory- and non-
signatory countries
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Figure 4: The gure shows the relationship between the optimal aggregated
abatement level for the coalition and the non-signatories as the cost of abatement
declines.
For instance, we see from table 4, that for c = 0; 21 and  = 0; 5; which is the
highest value of the cost-parameter that gives a stable coalition of ve countries,
the optimal level of abatement for a single signatory country is qs = 10; 203: As
c declines from c = 0; 21 to c = 0; 13, which is the highest cost of abatement
that gives a stable coalition consisting of six countries,  = 0; 6; the optimal
abatement level increases to qs = 10; 415: This pattern continues as c declines
and the size of the stable coalition, ; rises.
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A similar pattern is found when looking at the optimal aggregated abate-
ment of the signatory countries, Qs, as pictured in gure 4. Clearly, as the stable
coalition expands, the number of signatory countries increases, and thus aggre-
gate pollution abatement will increase as c decreases every time an additional
country enters the coalition.
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Figure 5: Aggregated level of abatement as a function of the cost-parameter, c.
Considering the non-signatory countries optimal level of abatement, the
pattern is the opposite. From table 4 we see that the optimal level of abatement
for a single non-signatory country increases as the cost of abatement, c, declines
for a given size of the coalition, as shown analytically in chapter 4.1.3. When the
cost of pollution abatement declines to a level that triggers the stable coalition
size to increase, the optimal level of abatement for the remaining non-signatory
countries decreases, for so to increase as the cost declines towards the level at
which the coalition again expands. These results explain the ambiguity in the
analytical outcome in chapter 4.2.2. The abatement undertaken by a single
non-signatory country follows the pattern in gure 3 as the cost-parameter, c;
declines.
Clearly, as the size of the coalition becomes larger, the number of non-
signatory countries declines. The aggregated level of pollution abatement in
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Figure 6: The development in the level of welfare in the respective type of
countries as the cost of abatement declines.
the non-signatory countries, Qn; is thus reduced every time one of the non-
signatories enters the coalition and  increases, as shown graphically in gure
4.
The total level of pollution abatement in these ten countries increases steadily
as the cost of abatement declines. As indicated in gure 5, the aggregated level
of abatement increases evenly as the cost declines as long as the stable size of
the coalition remains unchanged. When the stable coalition expands, there is a
leap in the optimal total level of abatement, before it increases evenly towards
where the stable size of the coalition again is expanded.
Regarding the development in the welfare level in the respective countries,
both the welfare in the signatory and non-signatory countries, s and n; will
increase as the cost of abatement decreases and the stable coalition expands, as
pictured in gure 6. Clearly, as shown in gure 7, also the aggregated welfare,
; will increase as the cost of pollution abatement becomes lower.
To achieve a lower cost of pollution abatement, one or more countries must be
able or willing to invest in R&D such that the abatement technology improves,
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Figure 7: The total welfare increases as the cost of abatement declines.
and the cost of abatement declines for all countries. Also, this technology must
be di¤used to and implemented by the other countries. Given that the technol-
ogy is di¤used and implemented, and assuming that the "enthusiastic country"
invests in R&D - how much will the enthusiastic country invest? I will look into
this in the next chapter.
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5 Investments
Lowering the cost of pollution abatement requires investments in R&D. It is
relatively cheap to invent a technology that lowers the cost of abatement mar-
ginally. However, inventing breakthrough technologies, such as CCS, carbon
sequestration, or highly e¢ cient batteries that can be implemented in, for in-
stance, the transport sector, requires far greater amounts of investments.
5.1 The Investment Function
The more the enthusiastic country is able and willing to invest, the lower will
be the cost of pollution abatement, c. However, the marginal investment cost
is increasing as c ! 0; meaning that the more the enthusiastic country invests,
the more it has to invest to lower the cost of abatement by one more unit. The
investment function, I(c); is hence such that I 0(c) < 0; and I 00(c) > 0; and
I(0) =1: A simple explicit function that satises these conditions is
I(c) =
1
c
(43)
with
I 0(c) =   1
c2
< 0 (44)
and
I 00(c) =
2
c3
> 0 (45)
The investment function is illustrated in gure 8.
How much the country invests depends on the information structure of the
game. The information structure reects the response the enthusiastic country
meets from the other countries by investing in a cost-reducing technology. The
responses to a lower cost is thoroughly studied throughout this thesis. Also the
relation between the cost of abatement and the stable coalition is explained in
depth in earlier chapters. The information structure will be presented in the
following chapter.
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Figure 8: The investment cost is increasing as the cost-parameter c! 0:
5.2 Information Structure
The terms open-loop and closed-loop species two types of information struc-
tures in multi-stage games. The open-loop, or non-strategic information struc-
ture characterizes a situation where the players choose their strategy based on
calendar-time alone. Thus, the players do not take into account the response
of the other players at the point where they make their decision. This type
of information structure is appropriate for analyzing situations where the play-
ers, at the beginning of the game, do not observe any history other than their
own. The closed-loop, or strategic information structure, on the other hand,
describes a feedback strategy, where the players take into account the response
of the other players when making their decision. The open-loop equilibrium is
typically much easier to solve compared to the closed-loop equilibrium, since
the closed-loop strategy space is much larger. The open-loop equilibrium can
"serve as a useful benchmark for discussing the e¤ects of strategic incentives in
the closed-loop information structure, i.e., the incentives to change current play
so as to inuence the future play of opponents." (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991,
p. 130-131). In the model outlined in this thesis, the open-loop outcome is, in
fact, hard to solve, and I will therefore focus mainly on the closed-loop cases.
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When the enthusiastic country invests, in stage 0, and hence lowers the cost
of abatement for all countries, several strategic e¤ects should be taken into
account. First, the optimal level of abatement for the enthusiastic country,
which is one of the signatory countries, is altered. Second, the optimal level of
abatement of the other signatory countries change. Furthermore, the optimal
level of pollution abatement in the non-signatory countries are modied, as well
as the size of the stable coalition.
There are thus several strategic e¤ects that gives the enthusiastic country
incentives to invest in R&D such that the cost of pollution abatement declines;
The stable coalition is expanded, so more countries will sign the IEA and max-
imize aggregated net benet, leading to a higher global welfare level. As we
have seen, the investment might lead to lower abatement levels in the signatory
countries, since non-signatories will increase their abatement level, given that
the size of the stable coalition is not altered. This might be an extra incentive
for the enthusiastic country to invest more than just what is needed to increase
the size of the stable coalition.
In the closed-loop information structure, solving the game by using backward
induction, the enthusiastic country takes all these strategic feedback e¤ects into
account when making the investment decision.
5.3 Two Types of Investments
I will consider two types of investment strategies for the enthusiastic country.
The term enthusiastic is, as explained earlier, just a notion of a country with
a larger historical focus on educational policies. The two types of investment
strategies I will look at are one where the enthusiastic country invests "selshly",
and another where it invests "altruistically". The di¤erence between these is
the choice of which objective function to maximize when making the invest-
ment decision. When investing selshly, the enthusiastic country maximizes its
own net benet of the investment, while in the altruistic case, the enthusiastic
country maximizes global welfare when making the investment decision.
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5.3.1 Selsh Investment - Closed-Loop
An enthusiastic country that behaves selshly, invests to maximize its own pay-
o¤ of the investment, taking into account the response to this investment by
the signatory- and non-signatory countries, as well as the fact that the stable
coalition expands as c decreases. Since the enthusiastic country at this point
knows that it will be a signatory to the IEA, the optimal investment is found
by solving the following maximization problem:
max
c
fes = s   I(c)g (46)
The solution, taking into account the feedback this meets from the remaining
countries, gives the optimal investments in R&D leading to the development of
a technology that reduces the cost of abatement to c: The results are analyzed
numerically in chapter 5.4.
5.3.2 Altruistic Investment - Closed-Loop
Suppose now, that the country with the possibility of investing plays altru-
istically, so as to maximize global welfare of the investment, rather than its
own. The country will hence make the investment decision by solving the below
maximization problem:
max
c
(c) = ((c)  0; 1)s(c) + es(c) + (1  (c))n(c) (47)
which will give higher investments in R&D and a signicantly lower optimal
cost of pollution abatement, c:
5.3.3 Open-Loop Information Structure
The open-loop information structure can be regarded as a benchmark to empha-
size the importance of the strategic feedback e¤ects when developing national
policies in a global setting.
Say that the enthusiastic country knew its optimal level of pollution abate-
ment, both if investing selshly and when investing altruistically. Let this level
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be qs ; which corresponds to the optimal abatement level in the closed-loop in-
formation structure. If investing so as to minimize its costs to reach this level of
abatement, without taking into account the feedback e¤ects from the remaining
countries, the enthusiastic country would minimize the aggregated cost of pollu-
tion abatement and the investment cost according to the following minimization
problem:
min
c

cq2s
2
+
1
c

(48)
The rst order condition, giving the optimal cost of pollution abatement is
thus:
c =
p
2
qs
(49)
This leads to a level of investment in R&D that is lower than the optimal
investment level in the closed-loop information structure, both in the case of
investing selshly, and when investing altruistically. The cost-parameter c thus
turns out to be higher than the optimal cost-parameter in the two closed-loop
cases above. Hence, we have that the realized outcome, with respect to the level
of abatement and the stable size of the coalition, is lower than in the closed-loop
case. This fact makes the open-loop solution hard to nd.
Investing so as to reach the optimal level of abatement nationally, will thus
not lead to the same results as when taking into account the strategic feedback
e¤ects that are included in the closed-loop cases. Disregarding the strategic
e¤ects of national policies in an international setting will therefore not lead to
optimal decisions, and the investing country would have chosen to invest more
if given the possibility ex-post.
When facing an international challenge like global warming, it is therefore
important that every individual country takes into account the strategic e¤ects
of national actions when designing their climate policies.
In the numerical analysis below, only the closed-loop information structure
will be considered.
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5.4 Numerical Analysis, Part 3.
By investing in a technology that reduces the cost of pollution abatement for all
countries, the cost-benet ratio, cb ; declines, and the di¤erence in net benets of
pollution abatement between the non-cooperative and full-cooperative outcome
becomes smaller. The IEA will then achieve a higher degree of cooperation,
since the incentives to free-riding becomes lower, as stated in Barrett (1994).
The selsh and altruistic investment decisions lead to di¤erent optimal levels
of investment, and thus to di¤erent optimal costs of pollution abatement. The
situation is approaching the full cooperative outcome as c declines. It will,
however, in neither case be optimal to invest such that the rst-best solution is
reached, where all countries sign the agreement.
Here, I will analyze the two outcomes numerically, starting with the case
where the enthusiastic country invests "selshly".
5.4.1 Selsh Investment
The welfare of the enthusiastic country is dened as es = s I(c): Inserting for
the parameter values, we see from table 5 that the enthusiastic countrys welfare
level is increasing in the interval c = f0; 24; 0; 1g ; and decreasing thereafter, as c
declines towards zero. This is also showed graphically in gure 9. The optimal
decision for the selsh enthusiastic country is thus to invest to maximize its
payo¤ with regards to c: The enthusiastic country will therefore invest such
that the cost of abatement declines to c = 0; 1: The corresponding welfare level
for the enthusiastic country is then es = 481; 80; which is higher compared to
the case without investments; s( = 0; 4; c = 0; 25) = 472; 16. The welfare in
the remaining countries will be s = 491; 80 and n = 493; 28: The investment
thus leads to a Pareto-improvement, since all countrieswelfare levels increase
as a result of the lower cost of mitigating pollution.
The investment will lead to an expansion of the stable coalition from consist-
ing of four to six countries. The enthusiastic country will, furthermore, invest
more than what is necessary to achieve a stable coalition of six countries. As
shown in table 4, the highest cost of abatement leading to a stable coalition of six
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c  I(c ) es 
0,25 0,4 0,00 472,16 4738,12
0,24 0,4 4,17 469,40 4744,62
0,23 0,4 4,35 470,63 4755,12
0,22 0,4 4,55 471,83 4765,63
0,21 0,5 4,76 473,81 4810,64
0,20 0,5 5,00 474,80 4819,00
0,19 0,5 5,26 475,76 4827,35
0,18 0,5 5,56 476,69 4835,68
0,17 0,5 5,88 477,58 4843,99
0,16 0,5 6,25 478,43 4852,28
0,15 0,5 6,67 479,23 4860,52
0,14 0,5 7,14 479,96 4868,72
0,13 0,6 7,69 481,02 4894,66
0,12 0,6 8,33 481,42 4901,23
0,11 0,6 9,09 481,69 4907,67
0,10 0,6 10,00 481,80 4913,95
0,09 0,6 11,11 481,71 4920,01
0,08 0,7 12,50 481,53 4934,90
0,07 0,7 14,29 480,61 4939,37
0,06 0,7 16,67 479,08 4943,19
0,05 0,8 20,00 476,73 4950,65
0,04 0,8 25,00 472,45 4951,31
0,03 0,8 33,33 464,83 4948,53
0,02 0,9 50,00 448,87 4939,24
0,01 1 100,00 399,50 4895,00
0,00 1 1    
Table 5: The table shows the development in the welfare level of the enthusiastic
country, and the global welfare level, taken into account the investment cost.
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Figure 9: The welfare of the enthusiastic country as the cost-parameter, c! 0:
countries is c = 0; 13: The enthusiastic country has an incentive to invest more
than what is necessary to obtain a stable coalition of six countries, since the
optimal level of abatement for the non-signatory countries increase as the cost
declines for a given size of the stable coalition. The enthusiastic country, along
with the rest of the signatory countries, can thus relax their level of abatement
slightly by investing so that the cost is c = 0; 10 rather than 0; 13:
Regarding the level of pollution abatement, the investment will lead to an
aggregated level equal to Q( = 0; 6; c = 0; 10) = 91; 80; which is signicantly
higher than the level of abatement in the self-enforcing coalition without in-
vestments, Q( = 0; 4; c = 0; 25) = 81; 07: The results can be found in table 4.
This is due to two e¤ects: First, every single country will increase the level of
abatement when the cost declines su¢ ciently, and, second, the stable coalition
will increase, and more countries will maximize joint welfare rather than their
individual net benets of pollution abatement.
Since the enthusiastic country also benets from the investment in R&D,
it does not need to have a "moral obligation" to be willing to do so. If this
country had a moral obligation to invest to "save for all", it would invest more
45
than what maximized this country´s own net benet. In this case global welfare
would increase further, but on the cost of the enthusiastic countrys own welfare.
Such an altruistic investment will be elaborated below.
5.4.2 Altruistic Investment
In the altruistic case, the enthusiastic country invests to maximize global welfare
according to equation (47). This case lies closer to what can be regarded as a
moral obligation to "save for all" , since the enthusiastic country invests more
than what maximizes its own net benets. Numerically, this generates the
result outlined in table 5; and is shown graphically in gure 10. The global
welfare is maximized when the cost of abatement is equal to c = 0; 04; which
expands the stable coalition to consisting of eight countries,  = 0; 8.
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Figure 10: The global welfare, taken into account the investment cost, is maxi-
mized when the cost-parameter is equal to c = 0; 04:
Considering the enthusiastic countrys welfare, it will still be greater than in
the initial situation, without any investments, although just marginally greater.
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An investment lowering the cost of pollution abatement to c = 0; 04 leads to a
net-benet in the enthusiastic country equal to es( = 0; 8; c = 0; 04) = 472; 45,
while without the investment it would have been s( = 0; 4; c = 0; 25) =
472; 16: The welfare level in the other countries will, furthermore, rise accord-
ingly to s = 497; 45 and n = 498; 36: Also here, for the same reasons as in the
previous case, the country will invest more than necessary to reaching a stable
coalition consisting of eight countries. Investing to maximize the global wel-
fare thus also leads to a Pareto improvement compared to the initial situation
without investments.
The level of abatement will as a result of the altruistic investment increase
from Q( = 0; 4; c = 0; 25) = 81; 07 to Q( = 0; 8; c = 0; 04) = 96; 4: which is
close to the full cooperative outcome without investments.
These two cases, show the importance of the strategic e¤ects of the invest-
ment. When the cost declines, and the stable coalition expands, the optimal
abatement level in all countries increases. This a¤ects the benet of the enthu-
siastic country positively.
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6 Conclusions
In this thesis I have examined the role of strategic technology development
for the outcome of International Environmental Agreements (IEAs), and the
incentives to make such investments. The analysis is based on a quadratic cost-
benet model introduced by Barrett (1994). I have extended this model to
including investments in R&D by a single "enthusiastic" country, such that the
cost of pollution abatement is reduced globally. The model has, as in Barrett
(1994), been solved numerically for ten countries, which can also be regarded
as ten world regions.
I have not evaluated the realism of the chosen investment function. It may be
that the chosen function yields more optimistic results than what is realistic, and
that this leads to conclusions that might reect a certain "technology optimism".
The important is, however, the mechanisms, which are thoroughly evaluated
throughout this thesis.
The literature on self-enforcing IEAs gives a rather grim picture of the possi-
bilities for solving the climate challenge. The reason behind this is that when the
gains to cooperation are substantial, the incentive to free-ride is large, resulting
in low participation in IEAs. Conversely, when the di¤erence in net-benets
between the non-cooperative and full cooperative outcome is small, cooperation
is relatively easy to achieve. The challenges the world faces today with regards
to the climate, is a situation where the gains to cooperation are large.
The fact that the higher the net benets are from constructing an IEA, the
lower is the participation level, is not necessarily a problem - it also creates pos-
sibilities. This is where investments in R&D to develop cost-reducing abatement
technologies plays a main role. If a country can impact the cost-benet ratio
through investing in a technology that lowers the costs of pollution abatement
for all countries, the situation is improved through two mechanisms: First, since
the cost of mitigating pollution is reduced, more abatement will be undertaken,
and second, since the di¤erence in net-benets in the non-cooperative and full
cooperative outcome becomes lower, the incentive to free-ride is lower, and more
nations will participate in the climate coalition. There is thus a double dividend
from investing in R&D to develop cost-reducing technologies.
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In this thesis the focus has been on a frontrunner country, which I have
called the "enthusiastic" country. This country is characterized by having a
higher level of human capital, and thus lower costs of developing a cost-reducing
abatement technology, compared to the remaining countries. I have analyzed
two types of investments: one where the enthusiastic country invests selshly, so
as to maximize its own net benets of the investment, and another, where the
country invests altruistically, maximizing the worlds net benet of the invest-
ment. The rst best, meaning full cooperation, will not be achieved in either
case. The investment will, however, pay o¤ in an expanding stable coalition,
and all countries, including the enthusiastic country, will earn higher welfare
levels compared to the ex-ante situation in both the selsh and the altruistic
case. The investment thus leads to a Pareto improvement in both cases, mean-
ing that if a country has the possibility to invest in such technology, it should
and will actually do so. A selsh investment will increase the welfare in the
enthusiastic country, and also lead to increased welfare globally. The altruistic
investment yields greater achievements globally, but will only lead to a marginal
increase in welfare for the enthusiastic country, due to higher investment costs.
Although the model developed throughout this thesis is rather simplistic, it
captures the idea that investments in R&D to develop cost-reducing abatement
technologies can be a possible, and even necessary, approach to both increasing
participation in IEAs and to increase mitigation of GHGs. The rather grim
results in the literature on self-enforcing IEAs, concluding that stable coali-
tions typically consist of a relatively small number of countries, is thus altered
when introducing the possibility of investments such that the cost of abatement
declines for all countries. Also, the model reects the importance of strategic
investment policies. A country should, when making the investment decision,
take into account the strategic e¤ects this technology has on the abatement
decision in all other countries.
As we have seen, the stable size of the coalition depends critically on the
parameter values. To increase the level of mitigation activities, targets and
timetables, which is the main focus in the current climate negotiations, may not
be the appropriate tools, since it does not impact the size of the self-enforcing
IEA. However, investing in R&D to develop cost-reducing mitigation technolo-
gies, will alter the size of the self-enforcing IEA, and thus increase both the
participation and the level of abatement undertaken in both the signatory coun-
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tries, and the singletons outside the coalition. To reach a successful outcome of
future climate negotiations, the focus should thus be turned from targets and
timetables to investments in developing cost-reducing abatement technologies,
which will enhance both participation and mitigation activities.
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